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Officially, there is no such thing as “proportionality review” in American administrative 
law. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946, the framework statute governing 
administrative law, does not recognize proportionality as a general head of review. Nor 
have American courts ever developed a judge-made doctrine of proportionality as such, 
either prior to or following the APA’s enactment. While the immense scholarly literature 
on proportionality continues to grow by leaps and bounds, virtually nothing has been 
written about proportionality in American administrative law, no doubt in part because it 
is assumed there is nothing to write.2 
                                                
1 Assistant Professor of Law, Penn State Law. Thanks to Jamison Colburn, Paul Craig, 
William Fox, Arden Rowell, Jamelle Sharpe, Takis Tridimas, and Chris Walker for 
helpful comments and conversations, and to Rebecca Buckley-Stein for excellent 
research assistance.  
2 Perhaps the closest thing is historical scholarship on nineteenth-century understandings 
of the states’ police power. William Novak’s important book has shown how state police 
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Why, then, include a chapter about the United States in a book about proportionality 
review in administrative law? In lieu of proportionality, American administrative law 
features a congeries of doctrines that courts deploy to evaluate agency exercises of 
discretion under different circumstances, in ways described in detail below. In some 
respects, these frameworks for review resemble proportionality in operation, but there are 
also notable differences. For these reasons, the contrast between proportionality review 
and American approaches to the review of discretion is potentially illuminating, 
highlighting what may be distinctive features of both.3  
 
Looking at the doctrines governing judicial review of administrative discretion in the 
United States, three features stand out. First, American judicial review is characterized by 
a high degree of unpredictability. Of course, law is rarely perfectly predictable, but I 
would contend that judicial review of discretion is in a special class. Not only is it often 
                                                                                                                                            
powers could curb private property rights and other private interests, under conditions of 
“necessity.” See William J Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in 
Nineteenth-Century America (University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 
3 In some respects, the closest analogue to proportionality analysis in American 
administrative law is in the regulatory review process, which is carried out not by courts, 
but within the executive branch. Early in his first term, President Ronald Reagan issued 
an executive order instructing agencies, to the extent permitted by law, to undertake 
regulatory action only when “the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh 
the potential costs;” to choose objectives “to maximize the net benefits to society;” and 
when considering alternative approaches to an objective, to choose the one “involving the 
least net cost to society.” Exec Order No 12291, 46 Fed Reg 13193. For major rules, the 
order further requires agencies to submit to the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA), which is located within the Executive Office of the President, a 
regulatory impact analysis that demonstrates the rule’s cost-benefit justification and its 
superiority to alternatives. President Reagan’s successors have continued regulatory 
review but tweaked it, broadening the set of values that agencies should consider in their 
analysis to include equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts. Thus, at the 
behest of the White House, agencies themselves now are expected to conduct a sort of 
proportionality review in-house. But because this volume focuses on proportionality 
review of administrative action as practiced by courts, regulatory review falls outside of 
the scope of this chapter.  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2561583 
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difficult to predict the outcome of judicial review in particular cases, but the uncertainty 
runs deeper. In a considerable number of cases, there is substantial uncertainty even as to 
what framework of review the court will apply, and even when it is nominally clear 
which standard governs, there often remains substantial uncertainty over what kind of 
analysis the court will perform, and how intensively it will scrutinize the challenged 
agency action.  
 
The second point speaks directly to a contrast with proportionality. Classical 
proportionality review is designed to detect and correct a particular kind of administrative 
failure: an overreach, in which the government uses measures that are excessive in 
relation to the ends they are designed to achieve. Judicial control of discretion in 
American administrative law is more symmetrical, in that the agency is required to 
explain its actions whether the claim is that they go too far, or that they do not go far 
enough. However, as described further below, there are countervailing doctrines in 
American administrative law that make judicial redress more likely for agency failures of 
commission than for failures of omission.  
 
Third, reviewing courts in American administrative law tend to “proceduralize” 
substantive review, focusing more on the agency’s failures to throughly ventilate the 
relevant issues than the merits of the agency’s conclusions.4 The end result may often be 
the same, in terms of what agency actions are blocked. But proceduralizing substantive 
review may have other consequences, both for the burdens agencies face before 
reviewing courts (which may be more substantial), and for the ultimate ability of agencies 
to realize favored policy options (which may be greater).  
 
This chapter develops these points in the course of a discussion of the judicial review of 
agency exercises of discretion under American administrative law. The next section sets 
                                                
4 Jerry L Mashaw and David L Harfst, ‘Regulation and Legal Culture: the Case of Motor 
Vehicle Safety’ (1986) 4 Yale J on Reg 257.  
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the stage for that discussion by sketching the doctrinal lay of the land. The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) looms large here, as this statute defines the basic 
categories of agency action and the standards of judicial review. The APA makes review 
broadly available, but a number of exceptions, both statutory and judge-made, shield 
much of what agencies do from the scrutiny of courts. When review is available, the 
scope of review under the APA may turn on a series of distinctions: whether the agency 
acts through adjudication or rulemaking; whether it uses formal or informal procedures; 
and whether the challenge addresses a determination of fact, law, or policy. 
 
The following section focuses sustained attention on the review standard most closely 
associated with agency discretion: arbitrary and capricious review. I work in detail 
through the reasoning employed in three important arbitrary and capricious review cases, 
decided over a span of almost forty years: National Tire Dealers and Retreaders v. 
Brinegar, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co., and FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. The detailed analyses of these 
cases build a platform for considering both how arbitrary and capricious review may be 
changing, and for ways in which it is similar to and different from proportionality review. 
 
Agencies also exercise significant discretion in the course of interpreting the statutes they 
administer, and the penultimate section of the chapter considers how courts review 
agency interpretations of statutes. In spite of judicial and scholarly engagement with this 
topic, this section shows that it is not entirely clear how the standards of review employed 
in this context relate to arbitrary and capricious review. A brief, final section concludes.  
Judicial	  Review	  in	  American	  Administrative	  Law:	  An	  Overview	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Although all American states have their own agencies that are also subject to judicial 
review, this chapter concerns federal administrative law exclusively.5 The focus here is 
squarely on the federal Administrative Procedure Act, which lays out the default rules of 
administrative law, although Congress can dictate agency-specific alternatives by 
statute.6 The APA lays out both the procedures that agencies must follow in carrying out 
their mandates under the statutes that they administer, and the standards that courts apply 
in reviewing agency action. The courts that review administrative actions in the United 
States are ordinary federal courts, as opposed to specialized administrative tribunals. 
 
The	  Availability	  of	  Review	  	  
 
The APA contains generous provisions for judicial review, accompanied by generous 
exceptions. First, the APA defines “agency” broadly to include “each authority of the 
Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by 
another agency,” except for Congress, the courts, territorial governments, and a few other 
exceptions.7 The APA further provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute 
and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject 
to judicial review.”8 Courts have read this provision to establish a general presumption 
                                                
5 The majority of states have adopted or been influenced by model administrative 
procedure acts that resemble the APA in important respects. Arthur Earl Bonfield, ‘The 
Federal APA and State Administrative Law’ (1986) 72 Va L Rev 297; Ronald M Levin, 
‘Rulemaking Under the 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act’ (2010) 20 
Widener LJ 855.  
6 See, for instance, Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 USC § 655(f) (providing that 
substantial evidence review, rather than the APA default of arbitrary and capricious 
review, will apply to health and safety rules promulgated by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Commission). 
7 5 USC §§ 551(1) (defining agencies for purposes of the APA’s requirements), 701(b) 
(defining agencies for purposes of judicial review). The Supreme Court has also held that 
the President does not qualify as an agency for purposes of the APA. Franklin v 
Massachusetts, 505 US 788, 801 (1992). 
8 5 USC § 704. 
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that final agency action is subject to judicial review.9 “Agency action,” in turn, is defined 
in expansive terms, to include “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, 
sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.”10 Notably, this 
provision extends judicial review to include agency rules, which are the chief instruments 
of agency policymaking. In principle, then, the APA empowers courts to sit in judgment 
over agency policy choices and the design of regulatory programs, to a degree that 
administrative lawyers in other legal systems might find surprising.11  
 
The APA is also generous in granting rights to initiate judicial review. A different 
provision of the APA permits any person “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency 
action within the meaning of a relevant statute” to initiate judicial review.12  
 
However, judicial review is not as widely available as a quick read of the APA might 
suggest. First, as already noted, the APA is only a default statute, and it recognizes that 
an agency’s organic statute may preclude judicial review entirely (although few do).13  
 
Second, the APA expressly precludes review to the extent that “agency action is 
committed to agency discretion by law.”14 The question inevitably follows: what does it 
mean for agency action to be “committed to agency discretion by law”? In Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park, the Supreme Court approvingly quoted the legislative history of 
the APA for the proposition that the exception covers “those rare instances where 
                                                
9 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v Volpe, 401 US 402 (1971). See also Nicholas 
Bagley ‘The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability’ (2014) 127 Harv L Rev 1285 
(challenging the presumption). 
10 5 USC § 551(13). 
11 Susan Rose-Ackerman Controlling Environmental Policy: the Limits of Public Law in 
Germany and the United States (Yale University Press, 1995). 
12 5 USC § 702. 
13 5 USC § 701(a)(1). 
14 5 USC § 701(a)(2). 
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‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’”15 
For instance, the National Security Act provided that the Director of the CIA “may, in his 
discretion, terminate employment of any officer or employee of the Agency whenever he 
shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interest of the United States.”16 
Finding that the language “fairly exudes deference to the Director,” the Supreme Court in 
1988 held that the decision to fire a covert electronics technician on account of his sexual 
orientation was committed to the agency’s discretion, and hence unreviewable, except 
insofar as it was the basis for constitutional claims.17 
 
Although the “committed to agency discretion” exception permits relatively few agency 
actions to evade judicial review, its greater impact may be blocking review of agency 
inaction. The Supreme Court has analogized agency discretion over bringing 
enforcement actions to prosecutorial discretion, and found “a general presumption of 
unreviewability of decisions not to enforce.”18 For instance, executions by lethal 
injections in the United States are carried out using drugs that are regulated by the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA). Death row inmates petitioned the FDA to investigate 
the use of these drugs in executions as the “unapproved use of an approved drug” in 
violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, which the FDA administered. 
The agency declined to do so, and the inmates sued. The Supreme Court found for the 
agency, holding that “an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through 
civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s absolute 
discretion.”19 An agency, with finite resources for enforcement, must make choices about 
how to deploy them, and these choices “often involve[] a complicated balancing of a 
                                                
15 Overton Park (n 9) 410 (quoting S Rep No 752, 79th Cong, 1st Sess, 26) (1945). 
16 50 USC § 403(c) (1988). 
17 Webster v Doe, 486 US 592 (1988). Justice Scalia, in dissent, proposed a broader 
reading of the exception, which would encompass the pre-APA “common law” of 
unreviewable executive discretion. ibid 608-10 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
18 Heckler v Chaney, 470 US 821 (1985). 
19 ibid 831. 
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number of factors which are peculiarly within its expertise.”20 The matter is different 
when a statute mandates certain enforcement actions.  
 
Moreover, the requirement that agency action be “final” means that even consequential 
agency actions can be shielded from review altogether where agency choices are given 
legal effect by other governmental actors. For instance, in Dalton v. Specter,21 the 
Supreme Court found the Secretary of Defense’s order to close the Philadelphia Naval 
Shipyard unreviewable. Under the governing statute, a commission with input from 
military leaders makes recommendations to the President on which military bases should 
be closed or realigned, and the President must either accept or reject the commission’s 
recommendations in their entirety. Petitioners alleged procedural and substantive 
problems with the commission’s work as well as actions of the Secretaries of the Navy 
and Defense. The Supreme Court, however, found the decision to close the base 
unreviewable. The commission’s recommendations did not constitute a final agency 
action, since they lacked legal effect before the President acted on them, and the 
President’s endorsement of the recommendations was not subject to review, because the 
President is not an agency within the meaning of the APA.  
 
In addition, notwithstanding the APA’s statement that a “failure to act” is reviewable, 
judicial restrictions on what kinds of failures to act are reviewable have come close to 
rendering this provision a dead letter. In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, an 
environmental group sought to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 
failure to take steps to protect a Wilderness Study Area against environmental 
degradation, as required by federal law.22 The Supreme Court turned back the challenge 
without reaching its merits, holding that the only failures to act made reviewable by the 
APA are failures to take a discrete agency action that is mandated by law.  
                                                
20 ibid. 
21 511 US 462 (1994). 
22 542 US 54 (2002). 
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Furthermore, broad exceptions from the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures for 
military and foreign affairs functions, interpretative rules, general statements of policy, 
and other matters where the agency finds “good cause” decreases the potency of judicial 
review where they apply by exempting agency activity from the procedural standards that 
agencies would otherwise have to observe.23 Moreover, agencies may be able to delay 
review or evade it entirely by using interpretative rules, guidance documents, and policy 
statements to make consequential policy choices. So-called “nonlegislative” rules are 
generally subject only to collateral challenge incident to agency enforcement actions 
against regulated parties. To the extent nonlegislative rules favor regulated parties, or 
their in terrorem effect induces compliance, they will not face judicial review at all. 24  
Lastly, as discussed further below, restrictive judicial rulings on who has standing to 
bring suit in federal court as a constitutional matter have undercut somewhat the APA’s 
broad provisions for access to judicial review. 
 
The	  Scope	  of	  Review	  
 
If the rules governing the availability of judicial review in American administrative law 
are somewhat difficult to navigate, the same can be said of the scope of review. 
According to the Attorney General’s Manual to the Administrative Procedure Act, long 
considered the most reliable contemporaneous guide to the intentions of the statute’s 
drafters, the APA was meant to restate and codify existing practices with respect to the 
scope of judicial review.25 Prior to the enactment of the APA, judges had developed a 
variety of standards for reviewing administrative actions, including abuse of discretion, 
arbitrary and capricious, and not supported by substantial evidence. Given that these 
                                                
23 5 USC § 553(a)(1), (b)(3)-(4). 
24 David L Franklin, ‘Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short 
Cut,’ (2010) 120 Yale LJ 276. 
25 Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act (1947) 108. 
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standards of review had been developed piecemeal by different courts over a period of 
years, it is no surprise that, in the words of some leading scholars, “§ 706 [the scope of 
review section] is not a model of linguistic clarity or coherence.”26  
 
Which framework for review applies may depend on the form of agency action at issue, 
the level of procedural formality involved, and also the nature of the agency 
determination that is being contested. With respect to the form of agency action, the APA 
generally requires agencies to act through one of two processes: adjudication and 
rulemaking. The APA also establishes two levels of procedural formality—formal, a.k.a. 
“on-the-record,” and informal—that statutes may require agencies to observe.  
 
On-the-record adjudications resemble trials, complete with an impartial decision maker 
presiding, the presentation of evidence, and opportunities for the direct and cross-
examination of witnesses. On-the-record adjudications are typically employed to decide 
individual claims within a statutory framework administered by an agency. So, for 
instance, individuals’ applications for disability benefits and foreign nationals’ petitions 
for asylum are both handled through formal adjudications, conducted by the Social 
Security Administration and the Executive Office of Immigration Review, respectively. 
Agencies also tend to use formal adjudications when they put individuals or entities “on 
trial” for statutory violations, as when the Federal Trade Commission brings charges 
against a business for using unfair or deceptive acts or practices.  
 
Rulemakings paradigmatically involve the formation of agency policy, rather than the 
resolution of individual claims or charges. The APA contemplates that rules will have 
prospective effect and “implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”27 When the 
EPA promulgates national ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act, for 
                                                
26 Ronald A Cass and others, Administrative Law: Cases and Materials (6th edn, Aspen 
2011) 113. 
27 5 USC § 551(4). 
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instance, it does so by making a rule. In contrast to adjudications, rulemakings are more 
often conducted using informal procedures, which dispense with the trappings of a trial, 
but afford public notice of the agency’s plans and an opportunity for interested 
individuals to comment (hence, “notice-and-comment rulemaking”).28  
 
A further set of distinctions can be drawn between agency actions that involve 
determinations on matters of fact, matters of law, and matters of policy or discretion. The 
fact that the compartments dividing issues of fact, law, and policy are by no means 
watertight has not stopped Congress and the courts from outlining and elaborating 
judicial review doctrines that rely on these distinctions.29 Although adjudication is 
modeled on judicial trials and rulemaking is modeled on the legislative process, as a 
practical matter, either process can involve all these types of determinations.  
 
Putting the pieces together now, what framework courts use to review an administrative 
action may depend on (1) the process used (rulemaking or adjudication), (2) the level of 
formality (formal or informal), and (3) the kind of agency determination at issue (fact, 
law, or policy). For instance, the APA specifies that factual findings made in on-the-
record proceedings are subject to “substantial evidence” review. In other words, they will 
be upheld unless the reviewing court finds them to be “unsupported by substantial 
evidence” in the record as a whole.30 As a practical matter, these on-the-record 
proceedings are almost always adjudications.31  
                                                
28 While these generalizations about the uses of adjudication and rulemaking generally 
hold, they are not ironclad. The Supreme Court has ruled that agencies with authority to 
conduct both rulemakings and adjudications can use either to make policy, and the 
National Labor Relations Board in particular has historically favored the use of 
adjudication as a policymaking tool. See NLRB v Wyman-Gordon Co, 394 US 759 
(1969). 
29 Christopher Edley, Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control of Bureaucracy 
(Yale UP 1992). 
30 5 USC 70(2)(E). See also Universal Camera Corp v NLRB, 340 US 474 (1951) 
(making clear, in the context of the similarly worded scope of review provision of the 
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With respect to legal questions, the APA provides that “the reviewing court shall decide 
all relevant questions of law, [and] interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.”32 In 
fact, when reviewing agency actions courts have never decided all questions of law de 
novo, but have instead devised a number of deference formulas, some of which are 
discussed further below. The APA also seems to contemplate some de novo judicial fact-
finding: it commands the reviewing court to set aside agency action “unwarranted by the 
facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.”33 
Commentators have differed on whether courts should resort to de novo review of facts 
when the agency has compiled no record,34 but in any event, the Supreme Court has 
given a narrow construction to the de novo review provision.35  
 
Most relevant for present purposes is the provision of the APA that permits courts to hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”36 This 
provision governs agency determinations that are neither questions or law nor questions 
of fact decided in on-the-record proceedings, and so sweep in the bulk of agency 
                                                                                                                                            
National Labor Relations Act, that the substantiality of evidence must be determined on 
the basis of the record as a whole). 
31 On-the-record rulemakings are notoriously inefficient policymaking tools. An 
egregious and oft-cited example is the FDA rulemaking to determine the minimum 
peanut content of peanut butter, which lasted nine years and produced a transcript 7,736 
pages long. Robert W Hamilton, ‘Rulemaking on a Record By the Food and Drug 
Administration’ (1972) 50 Tex L Rev 1132, 1143-45. 
32 5 USC § 704. 
33 5 USC § 706(2)(D). 
34 Compare Nathaniel L Nathanson, ‘Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing 
Variations and Standards of Judicial Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and 
Other Federal Statutes,’ (1975) 75 Colum L Rev 721 (supporting de novo review in this 
circumstance), with Stephanie Hoffer and Christopher J Walker, ‘The Death of Tax Court 
Exceptionalism,’ (forthcoming 2015) 99 Minn L Rev (urging remand to the agency to 
produce a record). 
35 Overton Park (n 9) 415. 
36 5 USC § 706(2)(A). 
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discretionary decisions, including “informal adjudications”: the countless, run-of-the-mill 
agency decisions that are neither rule makings nor formal adjudications.37 The next 
section is devoted to an examination of arbitrary and capricious review.38  
 
Arbitrary	  and	  Capricious	  Review	  
 
Drawing on the language of older judicial opinions, the APA permits courts to set aside 
actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law,” but courts have never taken pains to distinguish among the various 
grounds for reversal listed in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Instead, courts characteristically refer 
to “arbitrary and capricious” review as a single standard. In three respects, arbitrary and 
capricious review probably occupies the position in American administrative law closest 
to the position occupied by proportionality review in some other administrative law 
systems.  
 
First, while arbitrary and capricious review is not exactly a general head of review in 
American administrative law, it is something very close.39 Although certain kinds of 
agency decisions are subject to different standards of review—as noted above, for 
                                                
37 Overton Park (n 9) 410. 
38 The APA also establishes other heads of review that are of great importance to 
administrative law, but limited relevance to judicial control of agency discretion. 
Specifically, reviewing courts have the power to set aside agency actions that are 
unconstitutional (5 USC § 706(2)(B)), ultra vires (§ 706(2)(C)), or procedurally defective 
(§ 706(2)(D)). 
39 Proportionality is a general criterion of review in EU law, see Takis Tridimas, The 
General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 132, and in German Polizei- und 
Ordungsrecht, a body of law dealing not only with the police, but the regulation of 
threats to public welfare more generally, see Volkmar Götz, Allgemeines Polizei- Und 
Ordnungsrecht: Ein Studienbuch (15th edn, CH Beck 2012) 129-30. A debate continues 
in England over whether proportionality should be treated as a general head of review in 
administrative law. See Paul Craig, Administrative Law (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 
2012) 668-75. 
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instance, on-the-record factual determinations are reviewed under the substantial 
evidence standard—in the words of then-Judge Scalia, arbitrary and capricious review “is 
a catchall, picking up administrative misconduct not covered by the other more specific 
paragraphs.”40 Also, because “[t]he ‘scope of review’ provisions of the APA . . . are 
cumulative,” every agency action subject to judicial review must satisfy the arbitrary and 
capricious standard, whatever other tests it might have to survive.  
 
Second, arbitrary and capricious review applies to much of the discretionary 
decisionmaking of agencies. Other scope of review provisions on the APA govern 
questions of fact (in on-the-record proceedings) and questions of law. Arbitrary and 
capricious review covers what is left over. While acknowledging again the imprecision of 
the fact-law-policy distinction, a good part of the agency decisions that raise neither 
issues of fact nor issues of law could plausibly be described as policy choices, or as 
exercises of agency discretion.  
 
 Third and finally, unlike the other bases of review recognized in § 706, arbitrary and 
capricious review authorizes courts to evaluate and overturn agency actions on the basis 
of their substance, as opposed to procedural shortcomings,41 jurisdictional overreaching,42 
or lack of conformity with the Constitution.43 Arbitrary and capricious review is a form 
of merits review, in which the policy choice made the agency is evaluated on its merits.44 
However, as discussed below, there is a strong tendency in American administrative law, 
                                                
40 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv Orgs, Inc v Bd of Governors of the Fed Reserve Sys, 
745 F 2d 677, 683 (DC Cir 1984). 
41 5 USC § 706(2)(B). 
42 5 USC § 706(2)(C). 
43 5 USC § 706(2)(D). 
44 On merits review, which is a central organizing category of Australian administrative 
law in particular, see Peter Cane, ‘Judicial Review and Merits Review: Comparing 
Administrative Adjudication By Courts and Tribunals’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman and 
Peter L Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2010) 426. 
- 15 - 
even in arbitrary and capricious review, to describe problems with agency policy choices 
in terms of procedural failings.  
 
The	  Advent	  of	  “Hard	  Look”	  Review	  
 
Exactly what is “arbitrary and capricious” review? Its meaning has evolved over time, 
and even now, it remains something of a moving target. This section recounts its origins, 
and then explores in some depth its use in three cases—National Tire Dealers and 
Retreaders v. Brinegar, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., and FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.—to illustrate the 
varied modes of analysis that modern arbitrary and capricious review can entail.  
 
At the time the APA was enacted, arbitrary and capricious review was understood to be 
highly deferential to agency exercises of discretion. Arbitrary and capricious review was 
animated by the same spirit of deference to the policy choices of non-judicial actors as 
the “rational basis” review of legislation.45 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,46 
an important pre-APA Supreme Court case, illustrates the point. In that case, the NBC 
broadcasting network brought a number of challenges to radio regulations promulgated 
by the Federal Communications Commission. After dispensing with the petitioners’ 
claims that the agency had exceeded its authority under the governing statute, the Court 
turned to their argument that the regulations were nonetheless unlawful with the 
following words: 
 
The Regulations are assailed as “arbitrary and capricious”. If this 
contention means that the Regulations are unwise, that they are not likely 
to succeed in accomplishing what the Commission intended, we can say 
only that the appellants have selected the wrong forum for such a plea. 
                                                
45 See Wickard v Fillburn, 317 US 111, 129-130 (turning back a challenge to the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as arbitrary and capricious). 
46 319 US 190 (1943). 
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What was said in Board of Trade v. United States is relevant here: “We 
certainly have neither technical competence nor legal authority to 
pronounce upon the wisdom of the course taken by the Commission.” Our 
duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was 
based upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to 
authority granted by Congress. It is not for us to say that the “public 
interest” will be furthered or retarded by the Chain Broadcasting 
Regulations. The responsibility belongs to the Congress for the grant of 
valid legislative authority and to the Commission for its exercise. . . . If 
time and changing circumstances reveal that the “public interest” is not 
served by application of the Regulations, it must be assumed that the 
Commission will act in accordance with its statutory obligations.47 
 
Things began to change in the 1960s, thanks largely to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, 
the influential appellate court that handles the lion’s share of administrative law 
litigation. At a time when agencies were increasingly turning to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking as a policy-making tool,48 the judges of the D.C. Circuit began ratcheting up 
the scrutiny paid to agency choices through increasingly stringent application of arbitrary 
and capricious review. This more aggressive form of arbitrary and capricious review 
became known as “hard look” review. 
 
The name “hard look review” is itself instructive, if often misunderstood. Many assume 
that it refers to the court’s vigorous scrutiny of the agency, but the phrase originated to 
describe the kind of close attention an agency must give to the issues at hand.49 To quote 
from the seminal opinion, authored by Judge Harold Leventhal, 
 
Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene not merely in case 
of procedural inadequacies, or bypassing of the mandate in the legislative 
charter, but more broadly if the court becomes aware, especially from a 
combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a “hard 
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1960s and 1970s,’ (2001) 53 Admin L Rev 1139. 
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look” at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned 
decision-making.50 
 
For much of the 1970s, some judges on the D.C. Circuit took the view that reviewing 
courts should prescribe additional procedures, such as hearings, to remedy agencies’ 
failures to consider issues thoroughly.51 The Supreme Court put an end to this practice in 
the 1978 Vermont Yankee case,52 which held that courts may not impose procedural 
requirements not contained in the APA. But even when courts do not mandate specific 
procedures for agencies to follow, hard look review often casts substantive review in 
procedural terms. It is not the agency’s policy choices that are themselves inherently 
arbitrary and capricious; rather, what is arbitrary and capricious is the agency’s failure to 
justify its choices adequately in the face of the totality of the arguments and evidence 
before it. The agency is faulted not so much for its decision as for how it came to its 
decision. For a better sense of classical hard look review in action, we begin with a closer 
look at one of the D.C. Circuit’s cases, National Tire Dealers and Retreaders 
Association, Inc. v. Brinegar.53 
 
Hard	  Look	  Review	  in	  Action:	  National	  Tire	  Dealers	  	  
 
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act of 1966 grants the Secretary of 
Transportation the authority to “establish by order appropriate Federal motor vehicle 
safety standards.”54 The statute requires that each standard “shall be practicable, shall 
meet the need for motor vehicle safety, and shall be stated in objective terms.”55 In 
addition, the Act imposes the duty to establish standards on some specific matters. It 
                                                
50 Greater Boston Television Corp v FCC, 444 F 2d 841 (DC Cir 1970). 
51 For a detailed discussion of the debates over hard look review within the DC Circuit, 
see Schiller (n 48). 
52 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 US 519 (1978). 
53 491 F 2d 31 (DC Cir 1974). 
54 Public Law 89-563, Sept 9, 1966, 80 Stat 718, 719 §103(a). 
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specifies, among other things, that all safety standards for tires “shall require that tires . . . 
be permanently and conspicuously labeled with such safety information as [the Secretary] 
determines to be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.”56 The statute further 
requires that tire labels shall include, at a minimum, the number of plies in a tire, the 
maximum permissible load, and certain other information.  
 
The agency promulgated by regulation a tire safety standard in 1972. The regulation 
required that all retreaded passenger tires be permanently molded with the ply and load 
information specifically required by the statute, as well as the tire size, maximum 
inflation, and the words “tubeless” or “tube-type” and “belted” or “radial,” as applicable. 
The standard was challenged by a trade association of tire dealers and retreaders. 
Specifically, the challengers denied that the agency had demonstrated that the needs of 
motor vehicle safety could only be met through a permanent label containing the 
specified information.57  
 
The court noted that a permanent label was plainly not necessary to protect the original 
purchaser of retreaded tires, who could equally well be informed by a nonpermanent, 
affixed label at the point of sale. But, as the court acknowledged, the agency justified the 
requirement of a permanent label with reference to used retreaded tires. The preamble to 
the standard stated: 
 
Tires . . . . may be subject to many applications during their useful life. 
They are transferred from wheel to wheel and from vehicle to vehicle, and 
each time this takes place the information on the tire sidewall becomes 
important. Permanent labeling is therefore required if the information is to 
perform its function, as it can be readily assumed that affixed labels will 
last little longer than the first time the tire is mounted.58  
 
                                                
56 ibid § 201. 
57 491 F 2d 36. 
58 491 F 2d 36. 
- 19 - 
Still, the court argued, this did not go far enough to justify requiring permanent labels: 
“The Secretary has supplied no illustrations or references to the record to amplify these 
observations.”59 The court itself imagined two scenarios in which the lack of a permanent 
label could impair safety: when an original purchaser of retreaded tires needed to replace 
one or more with matching tires, and when a driver wishes to purchase used retreaded 
tires for his vehicle. Still, according to the court, the agency had not provided sufficient 
information to justify the conclusion that the permanent labeling requirement was 
appropriate: 
 
There is no suggestion in the record or briefs of how frequently these 
hypothetical situations arise. They might occur so rarely that a costly and 
burdensome permanent labeling requirement geared to ensure safety in 
such situations is unreasonable. Furthermore, it is not clear that a second-
hand purchaser of retreads or an original owner who seeks replacements is 
dependent on the tires’ labeling for information necessary to proper 
match-ups, inflation, and loading. The Secretary’s brief observes that an 
expert can determine many of the critical characteristics of a tire by mere 
inspection.60  
 
The court went on to note that the “apparently remote relationship between the permanent 
labeling requirement . . . and the goal of motor vehicle safety might be tolerable if those 
standards imposed no significant burden on the tire retreading industry.”61 In fact, 
however, evidence in the record suggests that permanent labeling would place a heavy 
burden on retreaders, and the agency meets this evidence with “mere assertions, 
unsupported by any citations to the record, that the requirements are practicable.” To 
develop the point, the court proceeded to undertake a deep dive into the mechanics of tire 
labeling.  
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For approximately 2/3 of the tire casings used by retreaders, the information required by 
the standard is not already printed in a location that would be visible after retreading. The 
retreading process involves removing the old tire tread, buffing the surface, affixing a 
new rubber tread with adhesive, and then vulcanizing it to the casing. To permanently 
label tires during this process, according to the court, 
 
“it would be necessary for an employee to work with hand-tools on a mold 
that would have a temperature somewhere between 250 and 300 degrees 
F. exposing him to the danger of burns in an effort to change the varied 
plates with this information on it as each tire is changed in the mold.” 
Altering the mold plates in this fashion would be necessary for almost 
every tire run through the production lines, since the size, number of plies, 
construction, maximum pressure, and other characteristics vary from tire 
to tire. Thus, permanent labeling of retreads with the various items 
specified in Standard No. 117 might be loosely analogized to 
personalizing a set of wedding invitations by engraving each one with the 
name of the individual invitee: the engraving plate would have to be 
changed for each invitation printed.62 
 
Although the comments “raise serious doubts” about the regulation, the court found the 
agency’s response inadequate. The agency noted that manufacturers are already required 
to imprint information on each tire they retread under a different regulation, but the court 
found that the existing regulation is substantially less onerous, because the information it 
requires does not change from tire to tire.  
 
As practiced in National Tire Dealers, hard look review shares substantial similarities to 
proportionality review. At the heart of the court’s analysis is what amounts to a necessity 
test: to serve the legitimate purpose of promoting motor vehicle safety, is it really 
necessary that tires be labeled permanently with this information? In application here, the 
test is quite demanding, because the court places the burden of establishing the necessity 
of its measure squarely on the shoulders of the agency. In the preamble to the rule, the 
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agency articulated a plausible reason why the information needed to be permanently 
affixed to the tire—to make the information available after the point of sale to those who 
might need it to select or match tires—but this is not enough for the court. The court 
further requires the agency to establish that “these hypothetical situations” arise 
frequently enough to justify the requirement.  
 
The opinion suggests, however, that the intensity of its necessity analysis is not a constant 
but a variable, to be adjusted based on the magnitude of the burden the challenged 
measure imposes. As the court notes, the looseness of fit between the permanent labeling 
requirement and the goal of auto safety might not be fatal were the challenged measure 
less burdensome on tire retreaders. The court seems to be endorsing variable intensity 
review, along lines similar to those suggested by some scholars of proportionality.63 This 
kind of analysis, which pegs the intensity of necessity review to the burden a challenged 
measure imposes, permits the court to roughly balance benefits and harms from the 
measure: the greater the burden, the more intensive the review, and therefore, the lower 
the measure’s chances of surviving. This approach gives the court a way to consider the 
weights of competing interests without engaging in an explicit balancing analysis. This 
kind of “stealth balancing” may hold particular appeal to judges in the United States, 
where judicial balancing of values can be controversial.64  
 
A	  Hard	  Look	  from	  the	  Supreme	  Court:	  State	  Farm	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 The United States Supreme Court hears only a handful of administrative law cases each 
term,65 and for more than a decade, it was not clear how the high court would receive the 
D.C. Circuit’s experiment with hard look arbitrary and capricious review. The Vermont 
Yankee decision of 1978,66 which took appeals courts to task for imposing on agencies 
procedural requirements not contained in the APA, suggested to many scholars that the 
Court would look with disfavor on the D.C. Circuit’s upgrade to the historically 
deferential arbitrary and capricious review. In fact, however, the Supreme Court surprised 
many in 1983 with its decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,67 while gave a full-throated endorsement to the 
hard look version of arbitrary and capricious review.  
 
Like National Tire Dealers, State Farm concerned a protracted rulemaking process 
conducted by the hapless NHTSA, this one involving passenger restraint safety standards. 
The Department of Transportation first issued a rule requiring seatbelts in passenger 
vehicles in 1967, but seatbelts could only work if worn, and the majority of motorists in 
the late 1960s declined to buckle up. In 1969, the agency responded by proposing a 
standard requiring passive restraints, which as a practical matter meant either automatic 
seatbelts or airbags. After much wrangling, the agency adopted a final rule in 1977, 
which required manufacturers to equip all new cars with passive restraints by model year 
1984. Then in 1981, the agency reopened the rulemaking process, and after a comment 
period, rescinded the passive restraint requirement altogether. An insurance company and 
trade association for insurers sued to challenge the rescission as arbitrary and capricious. 
They won in the appeals court, and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, an 
intervenor in the case, petitioned for review in the Supreme Court.  
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Writing for the Court, Justice Byron White laid out the arbitrary and capricious standard 
as follows: 
 
The scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard is 
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 
Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a “rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.” In reviewing that 
explanation, we must “consider whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear 
error of judgment.” Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and 
capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not 
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of 
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the 
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.68  
 
The Supreme Court’s decision put the agency’s explanation for changing course squarely 
at the center of its analysis. In a statement accompanying the rescission, the agency 
explained that new information undermined its earlier projections about the safety 
benefits of the passive restraint requirement. Initially, the agency had anticipated that 
roughly 60% of vehicles would meet the new requirements with airbags, but as the auto 
industry began finalizing its compliance plans, it became clear that around 99% of new 
cars would feature automatic seatbelts instead. Moreover, the vast majority of automatic 
seatbelts would be detachable belts, which, once detached, would remain disabled until 
rebuckled by the motorist. Because detachable belts require “the same kind of affirmative 
action that is the stumbling block to obtaining high usage levels of manual belts,” 
according to the agency, it was no longer clear that the standard would significantly 
increase motor vehicle safety.69  
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Justice White subjected the agency’s reasoning to a demanding examination. The Court 
took issue not only with how the agency considered the issues, but its failure to consider 
all the alternatives. “The first and most obvious reason for finding the rescission arbitrary 
and capricious,” according to the Court, “is that NHTSA apparently gave no 
consideration whatever to modifying the Standard to require that airbag technology be 
utilized.”70 The Court noted that the agency’s original rule proposal would have required 
installing airbags in all new cars, and that when an automatic seatbelt option was later 
proposed, the use of detachable seatbelts was approved only with manufacturers’ 
assurances that they would not compromise the standard’s safety goals. The Court stops 
short of insisting that the agency should have returned to an all-airbag standard. Rather, if 
the agency believed an all-airbag standard was unworkable, it had a duty to explain why:  
 
Given the effectiveness ascribed to airbag technology by the agency, the 
mandate of the Act to achieve traffic safety would suggest that the logical 
response to the faults of detachable seatbelts would be to require the 
installation of airbags. At the very least this alternative way of achieving 
the objectives of the Act should have been addressed and adequate reasons 
given for its abandonment. But the agency not only did not require 
compliance through airbags, it also did not even consider the possibility in 
its 1981 rulemaking. Not one sentence of its rulemaking statement 
discusses the airbags-only option.71 
 
Although concerns about an airbag-only standard emerged in the briefs and oral 
arguments before the Supreme Court, the Court disregarded them, noting that “the courts 
may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action.”72  
 
The Court also concluded that the agency was “too quick to dismiss the safety benefits of 
automatic seatbelts.”73 The agency dismissed the results of a study showing a substantial 
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increase in seatbelt use in vehicles with passive belts, on the grounds that participants in 
the study were not typical: they had purchased vehicles with extra safety features not 
required by law. The Court accepted that “it is within the agency’s discretion to pass 
upon the generalizability of these field studies.”74 However, the Court rejected the train 
of reasoning that led the agency to conclude that the use of detachable belts would not 
necessarily lead to even a five percentage point increase in seatbelt usage, because the 
agency “apparently take no account of the critical difference between detachable 
automatic belts and current manual belts.”75 The Court elaborated: 
 
 A detached passive belt does require an affirmative act to reconnect it, 
but—unlike a manual seatbelt—the passive belt, once reattached, will 
continue to function automatically unless again disconnected. Thus, 
inertia—a factor which the agency’s own studies have found significant in 
explaining the current low usage rates for seatbelts—works in favor of, not 
against, use of the protective device. Since 20% to 50% of motorists 
currently wear seatbelts on some occasions, there would seem to be 
grounds to believe that seatbelt use by occasional users will be 
substantially increased by the detachable passive belts. Whether this is in 
fact the case is a matter for the agency to decide, but it must bring its 
expertise to bear on the question.76  
 
In other words, the Court has a different theory from the agency about how occasional 
seatbelt users might respond to detachable belts. While the Court does not assert its own 
theory is superior to the agency’s, it does demand that the agency at least consider the 
alternate theory and reject it explicitly.  
 
Lastly, the Court found fault with the agency for failing to explain why it had not 
required nondetachable automatic belts in the safety standard. Specifically, the Court was 
not satisfied with the agency’s reasons for not requiring a continuous passive seatbelt, 
which the user can spool out to create the slack necessary to enter and exit the carseat. In 
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its rule, the agency explained that requiring passive belts with use-compelling features, 
such as continuous belts and ignition interlocks (which prevent ignition if the driver’s 
belt is not fastened), would be “counterproductive.” The agency noted “a widespread, 
latent and irrational fear in many members of the public that they could be trapped by the 
seat belt after a crash,” and concluded that “it would be highly inappropriate to impose a 
technology which by its very nature could heighten or trigger that concern.”77 Moreover, 
the agency added, it “would be unable to find the cause of safety served by imposing any 
requirement which would further complicate the extrication of any occupant from his or 
her car, as some use-compelling features would.”78  
 
The Court was not satisfied. The agency gave no reasons to justify its conclusion that the 
continuous belt option would be popular with the public, as the ignition interlock was. 
Nor had the agency cited any grounds for departing from its earlier conclusion that 
nondetachable belts with spool releases were no less safe than detachable belts. “While 
the agency is entitled to change its view on the acceptability of continuous passive belts,” 
the Court concluded, “it is obligated to explain its reasons for doing so.”79  
 
To those familiar with proportionality review, the State Farm decision is notable in 
several respects. First, the case does not concern administrative overreaching, as in the 
paradigm proportionality case, in which the administration has taken measures that are 
excessive in context. Rather, the claim is that the agency has underreached: its regulation 
does not go far enough to promote auto safety. This is not so much a matter of the 
authorities shooting at sparrows with cannons, in Fritz Fleiner’s memorable phrase, as of 
shooting at condors with a peashooter.80 In general, arbitrary and capricious review is 
symmetrical in a way that classic proportionality review is not: administrative action is 
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subject to challenge, and the agency’s reasons for its choices must stand up to the same 
scrutiny, whether the claim is that the agency has done too much or that it has not done 
enough.81  
 
That being said, there are doctrines in American administrative law that, as a practical 
matter, mean that arbitrary and capricious review is more often available to challenge 
agency overreach than agency underreach. First, although American standing doctrines 
are fairly liberal by international standards, they are generally more favorable to the 
targets of regulation than to the beneficiaries of regulation. The requirement that 
plaintiffs suffer an injury that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” 
can pose obstacles for the advocates of more vigorous regulation in areas where the 
benefits of agency action are diffuse.82 Second, notwithstanding the APA’s instance that 
the “failure to act” qualifies as agency action, courts are generally very reluctant to 
review agencies’ exercise of discretion not to take action., as noted above.83 State Farm is 
something of a special case, because the agency had first passed, and then rescinded, a 
passive restraint requirement. Had the agency never itself raised the possibility of passive 
restraints, it seems unlikely that the courts would have required the agency to mandate 
them. All that being said, reviewability doctrines are sufficiently malleable that courts 
may permit would-be beneficiaries of regulation to challenge agency inaction as arbitrary 
and capricious when they wish to. Notably, in 2007 a narrow majority of the Supreme 
Court chose to entertain, and ultimately upheld, the state of Massachusetts’ claim that it 
was arbitrary and capricious for the EPA to fail to determine whether greenhouse gas 
emissions contribute to global warming.84  
                                                
81 See Riverkeeper Inc v EPA, 475 F 3d 83 (2d Cir 2007) (sustaining an arbitrary and 
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As in proportionality analysis, the agency’s consideration of alternative measures is 
relevant to hard look review, but in hard look review, the obligation to consider 
alternatives extends farther, because it is not tethered to the question of whether the 
chosen measure is excessive. An actor subject to proportionality is required to consider 
whether the government’s objective could be equally well pursued using alternative 
measures that infringed less on the interests of others. The failure to consider less 
restrictive alternatives would be grounds for finding agency action arbitrary and 
capricious under hard look review, but so might the failure to consider more effective 
alternatives. 
 
 Even if the Supreme Court accepted NHTSA’s conclusion that its passive restraint 
standard would not significantly improve auto safety, that would not justify the agency’s 
rescission under hard look review. Rather, the agency had an obligation to consider an 
airbag-only alternative that might be more effective in meeting the statute’s goals. 
Significantly, hard look review does not merely impose an obligation to consider 
alternatives generated through the notice-and-comment process, although agencies have 
an obligation to address these as well.85 Instead, in its contemporaneous explanation of its 
policy choices, the agency is responsible for anticipating and responding to alternative 
possibilities that a reviewing court might later dream up. In State Farm, it appears that 
the possibility of an airbags-only rule was first raised by the Court of Appeals, 86 not by 
commenters on the agency’s proposal.87  
 
Furthermore, under hard look review as practiced in State Farm, the agency is on the 
hook not only for considering alternative policy choices, but alternative empirical 
predictions. As described above, NHTSA’s projection that the use of detachable belts 
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would not significantly enhance auto safety was based on a prediction about motorist 
behavior. The agency assumed that motorists who usually do not use manual belts would 
disconnect detachable belts and then leave them disconnected. The Court countered that 
even motorists who usually do not use manual belts habitually do buckle up some of the 
time, and suggested that such motorists might well end up leaving their automatic buckles 
attached. The Court expected the agency to explain why its theory of seatbelt use is more 
plausible.  
 
 Another factor to mention here is the open-endedness of hard look review. While 
proportionality challenges predictably feature some version of the claim that the agency 
has used disproportionate measures, under hard look review, an agency’s action is 
vulnerable if there is any respect in which it is not rationally justifiable. And given the 
plasticity of the arbitrary and capricious challenge, judicial review does not reliably 
proceed according to a pre-defined series of tests, as proportionality does. It may be very 
difficult for an agency to anticipate all of the faults that an aggrieved person may find 
with its actions, not to mention the ways in which the reviewing court may probe its 
reasoning. 
 
 In these respects, hard look review might appear to be even more demanding than 
proportionality review. Indeed, starting in the 1980s, many administrative law scholars 
claimed that unduly intensive judicial review was “ossifying” rulemaking, and pointed to 
hard look review as a chief culprit.88 Writing about NHTSA, Jerry Mashaw and David 
Harfst conclude that “[t]he result of judicial requirements for comprehensive rationality 
has been a general suppression of the use of rules.”89 Still, concerns over ossification 
seem to have faded over the past decades, perhaps in part because it is by no means clear 
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that hard look review is still the dominant approach to arbitrary and capricious review, as 
discussed further below.90  
 
In another respect, though, hard look review is more forgiving than proportionality 
analysis, precisely because of its emphasis on the agency’s reasoning process. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to redeem a measure that has been reviewed on its merits and 
deemed disproportionate. By contrast, because hard look review focuses on the agency’s 
reasoning, rather than the substance of its action itself, it leaves agencies that fail the test 
more latitude to achieve their desired results, if they can only give a better account of 
their choices. While some observers are skeptical that the focus on agency’s reasoning is 
more than window dressing for judicial judgments about the content of agency choices, 
one empirical study suggests that agencies generally do eventually win judicial approval 
of policies first announced in rules found to be arbitrary and capricious.91  
 
The	  Twilight	  of	  Hard	  Look?	  Fox	  Television	  	  
 
How widely is the “hard look” version of arbitrary and capricious review actually 
practiced by American courts? A firm answer is not easy to come by, but there are 
reasons to expect that State Farm may be an outlier in terms of its intensity of review. 
Although the Supreme Court has never repudiated State Farm, Michael Herz noted in 
2004 that “the Supreme Court has cited State Farm only twenty-five times since 
Rehnquist became Chief Justice [in 1986] and then almost always in a dissent, or only to 
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be distinguished, or for a pabulum proposition, or in a mild and revisionist manner.”92 
This stands in stark contrast to the Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
decision, handed down the year after State Farm, which the Supreme Court has cited 
favorably scores of times. Chevron, which applies to agency interpretations of statutes, 
embodies a more deferential form of scrutiny than the hard look variant of arbitrary and 
capricious review, as discussed below.93  
 
The FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. case from 2009 illustrates a more recent, and far 
more forgiving, application of arbitrary and capricious review.94 The case played out 
against a backdrop of prodigiously profane celebrity appearances on award shows 
broadcast on American network television. Cher dropped a choice four-letter word into 
her acceptance speech at the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, and Nicole Ritchie used a 
few more at the following year’s ceremony. Although federal law prohibits the broadcast 
of “obscene, decent, or profane language,” the broadcasters were not initially subject to 
penalties, because staff rulings of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had 
established a safe harbor for “fleeting expletives”—nonliteral and nonrepetitive 
utterances of offensive words. But when Bono used a vulgar intensifier to underline his 
excitement over winning an award at the 2003 Golden Globes, the FCC changed course. 
Reversing a staff ruling that the Golden Globes broadcast was not indecent, the FCC in 
2004 issued an order declaring that fleeting expletives could violate broadcasting laws 
and be a basis for penalties. Relying on its Golden Globes order, in 2006 the agency 
declared that the 2002 and 2003 Billboard broadcasts also were indecent, but declined to 
impose fines. Fox challenged the indecency findings as arbitrary and capricious. 
 
A central issue for the Supreme Court was whether, and how, it was relevant to arbitrary 
and capricious analysis that the agency was changing its policy. Writing for a 5-4 
                                                
92 Michael Herz ‘Rehnquist Court and Administrative Law’ [2004] 99 Nw UL Rev 314. 
93 See text at 100 to 104. 
94 556 US 502. 
- 32 - 
majority on this point, Justice Scalia concluded that the agency’s past position had 
limited relevance: 
 
[The agency] need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the 
reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it 
suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are 
good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the 
conscious change of course adequately indicates.95  
 
Writing for the four dissenters, Justice Breyer denied that the agency’s switch dictated a 
heightened level of scrutiny, but insisted that it was nonetheless relevant to the analysis. 
The action that the agency must justify is a change in policy, and so the agency must give 
an adequate account of that change. That requires “the agency here to focus upon the 
reasons that led the agency to adopt the initial policy, and to explain why it now comes to 
a new judgment.”96 
 
The majority wasted little time in concluding that the agency’s new approach to fleeting 
expletives was not arbitrary or capricious. According to the Court: 
 
it was certainly reasonable to determine that it made no sense to 
distinguish between literal and nonliteral uses of offensive words, 
requiring repetitive use to render only the latter indecent. As the 
Commission said with regard to the expletive use of the F-Word, ‘the 
word’s power to insult and offend derives from its sexual meaning.’97  
 
Moreover, the agency’s conclusion that a safe harbor for fleeting uses of words would 
lead to more widespread use of offensive language was “surely rational (if not 
inescapable).”98 The majority’s application of the arbitrary and capricious standard to the 
facts of this case consumed all of two pages in the case reporter.  
                                                
95 ibid 516. 
96 ibid 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
97 ibid 512. 
98 ibid 518. 
- 33 - 
 
In a portion of the opinion that commanded only four votes, Justice Scalia dismissed 
arguments made in dissent that the FCC, like the Department of Transportation in State 
Farm, had failed to address important aspects of the problem before it. Justice Breyer’s 
dissent noted that the FCC had initially justified its policy on fleeting expletives to avoid 
running afoul of First Amendment protections for free expression. Against that backdrop, 
according to Justice Breyer, the agency had not explained why the constitutional calculus 
had changed. Justice Scalia, for his part, denied that the agency had any obligation to 
perform a constitutional analysis, but pointed out that the agency’s order did justify the 
regulation of indecency in general (if not this policy in particular) as constitutional. 
 
Justice Breyer also faulted the agency for failing to consider the policy’s chilling impact 
on small broadcasters, who would likely be unable to afford the pricey equipment needed 
to “bleep” bad language. The FCC had said nothing about this issue, but Justice Scalia 
stepped into the breach with some arguments of his own. Justice Scalia first posits that 
the “down-home local guests [on locally produced programming] probably employ 
vulgarity less than big-city folks; and small-town stations generally cannot afford or 
cannot attract foul-mouthed glitteratae from Hollywood.”99 Moreover, small broadcasters 
had little to fear, since the FCC’s order stated that it might be inequitable to penalize 
expletives that surface during the live broadcast of a public event, and in any case, the 
agency had the discretion to craft appropriate remedies that took account of relevant 
circumstances.  
 
Plainly, Fox Television presents a brand of arbitrary and capricious review that is 
substantially less searching than the hard look review of National Tire Dealers and State 
Farm. The core of the Court’s analysis resembles a fairly casual reasonableness review, 
in which the agency’s action is sustained because it is “reasonable” and “rational.” And 
                                                
99 ibid 527. 
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the fact that the agency once rejected the policy it now embraces out of concerns that it 
could unduly chill constitutionally-protected expression hardly enters the picture. The 
agency is not required to explain why these concerns now hold no sway, and indeed, the 
Court itself supplies arguments on the agency’s behalf to fend off the First Amendment 
objections. To the extent that Fox Television Stations is the shape of things to come, it 
signals a departure from the aggressive scrutiny of hard look review.  
 
The Court’s review in Fox Television is also notably less stringent than proportionality 
review. From a proportionality perspective, the central question is whether, in pursuing 
its goal of keeping the airwaves free from indecency, the FCC chose a policy that went 
too far, and unduly burdened free expression. Framed in this way, the agency’s 
justification must focus on explaining why the policy’s adverse impact on free expression 
would be limited, and acceptable in light of the gains made in pursuing the statute’s 
objective of keeping indecency off the air. The Court’s analysis, by contrast, does not 
require the FCC to justify its policy in these terms, or to explain why its choice strikes the 
balance between these competing considerations better than alternative approaches. 
Indeed, the agency has almost nothing to say on its policy’s impact on expression. 
Because the Court stops after evaluating the agency’s policy on its own terms and 
pronouncing it reasonable, it never squarely engages with the other interests at stake.  
 
Agency	  Discretion	  and	  Statutory	  Interpretation	  
 
As a practical matter, many of the important discretionary choices that agencies make are 
reflected in their interpretations of the statutes that they administer. A formidable body of 
law has grown up to address the sort of deference that courts owe to agency 
interpretations of statutes under different circumstances. This is not the place for a 
comprehensive analysis of these doctrines, but a discussion of judicial control of agency 
discretion would be incomplete without some reference to them.  
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The centerpiece of the Supreme Court’s deference jurisprudence is the famous Chevron 
decision from 1984.100 In Chevron, the Court devised a two-step analysis for evaluating 
agency interpretations of statutes: 
 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the 
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the 
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress 
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not 
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary 
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the 
court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.101  
 
Chevron is important conceptually not least because it explicitly recognizes agency 
statutory interpretation as a means by which agencies exercise discretionary decision-
making power delegated by Congress. The Court draws a connection between the actions 
agencies take pursuant to express grants of discretion, which are subject to arbitrary and 
capricious review, and the policy choices agencies make pursuant to implicit delegations 
in the form of statutory ambiguities, which are subject to Chevron reasonableness review:  
 
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are 
given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to 
an agency on a particular question is implicit, rather than explicit. In such 
a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory 
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an 
agency.102 
                                                
100 Chevron USA, Inc v Nat’l Res Def Council, 467 US 837, 842-43 (1984). 
101 ibid 
102 ibid 843-44 (emphasis added). 
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In the Chevron case itself, the key interpretive question concerned the “bubble concept”: 
whether the EPA would be permitted to treat an entire industrial facility as a “stationary 
source” of pollution for purposes of the pollution permitting regime of the Clean Air Act. 
The EPA’s interpretation would allow polluters to modify their facilities without 
obtaining new permits so long as total emissions did not rise. Environmental groups 
protested that the interpretation would undercut the statute’s goal of pollution reduction, 
while the agency maintained its interpretation would encourage facilities to favor 
technologies that polluted less. The Court concluded that “Congress did not have a 
specific intention on the applicability of the bubble concept in these cases,” and that “the 
EPA’s use of that concept here is a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make.”103 
The Court concluded the agency’s choice was reasonable largely because it represented a 
“reasonable accommodation” of the competing economic and environmental goals 
animating the Clean Air Act.104 
 
As prominent as it is, Chevron does not occupy the whole field of statutory interpretation. 
Chevron does not apply to all agency interpretations of statutes, and exactly when it 
applies remains a source of some confusion and controversy even now.  
 
In a 2001 case, United States v. Mead Corporation,105 the Supreme Court explained that 
Chevron applied whenever “Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with 
the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in the enacted 
law.”106 A congressional grant of rulemaking or formal adjudication power is “a very 
good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment,” but it is not dispositive.107 In 
the event that an agency interpretation does not merit Chevron review, it will be afforded 
                                                
103 ibid 844. 
104 ibid 865. 
105 533 US 218 (2001). 
106 ibid at 229. 
107 ibid. 
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the “sliding-scale” deference mandated by Skidmore v. Swift & Co.108 Under Skidmore, 
the weight a reviewing court will give to an agency’s interpretation “will depend upon the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”109   
 
The mixed deference regime inaugurated by Mead has drawn criticism from some 
prominent scholars for providing poor guidance to agencies and lower courts.110 In 
particular, it is not obvious how courts are to determine whether Congress would expect 
agencies to speak to a given issue with the force of law. The presumption that notice-and-
comment rulemakings and formal adjudications are Chevron-eligible turns out not to hold 
up in practice, at least as far as the Supreme Court is concerned: an empirical study by 
William Eskridge and Lauren Baer finds that, through 2006, the Supreme Court evaluated 
only a minority of these statutory interpretations under Chevron or a more deferential 
standard.111  
A	  Convergence	  of	  Standards?	  
 
How does judicial review of agency statutory interpretations compare to arbitrary and 
capricious review? There are really two questions here. First, what is the difference 
between an agency interpreting a statute and an agency exercising discretion under a 
statute? Second, what are the substantive differences, if any, between the standards of 
review courts apply in these two situations? The answer to neither question is completely 
clear.  
                                                
108 323 US 132 (1944). 
109 ibid 140. 
110 Thomas W Merrill, “The Mead Doctrine: of Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and 
Meta-Standards,” (2002) 54 Admin L Rev 807. 
111 William N Eskridge and Lauren E Baer, ‘The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan’ (2008) 
96 Geo LJ 1083. 
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In some cases, an agency is clearly either interpreting a statute or exercising discretion, 
and of course the parties’ pleading can help to clarify the questions before the court. In 
other cases, however, the distinction will not be so obvious, with the result that it is also 
not obvious how the court should review the agency’s action. Jack Beermann, for 
instance, makes a convincing argument that the Supreme Court could have approached 
Fox Television as a statutory interpretation case, the central question being whether the 
agency permissibly interpreted the statutes’s prohibition on “obscene, indecent, or 
profane language.”112 This would counsel reviewing the agency under the Chevron 
framework. In actuality, Chevron is mentioned nowhere in Fox Television’s five 
opinions.  
 
The Court faced a choice between these two frameworks directly in Judalung v. Holder, 
from 2011.113 This case concerned a Bureau of Immigration Appeals policy restricting 
relief from deportation for noncitizen criminals to those who would have had comparable 
grounds for relief under a provision of immigration law that had since been repealed. 
Arguing on the agency’s behalf, the Solicitor General maintained that the agency’s 
“comparable grounds” doctrine was entitled to deference under Chevron step two, as a 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision of federal law. The Court rejected 
this contention, and instead reviewed the agency under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard. In a footnote, the Court suggested that the choice was immaterial, since the 
standards are equivalent: “Were we to apply Chevron, our analysis would be the same, 
because under Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpretation is “‘arbitrary 
or capricious in substance.’”114  
                                                
112 Jack Beermann, ‘Chevron At the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These Years,’ 
(2014) 83 Fordham L Rev 114.  
113 132 S Ct 476 (2011). 
114 Judulang, 132 S Ct at 483 n 7. The Court went on to conclude that the case did not 
present a question of statutory interpretation, so its comment on the equivalence of 
Chevron and arbitrary and capricious review was dicta. 
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Judalung was not the only time the Supreme Court has suggested that Chevron step two 
reasonableness review is the same as arbitrary and capricious review,115 and a number of 
appeals courts have made this claim for years.116 They are joined by some legal scholars 
who have also argued that Chevron step two either is, or should be, identical to arbitrary 
and capricious review.117 One argument in favor of harmonizing Chevron step two and 
arbitrary and capricious review is that is would seem anomalous to subject agencies to 
more intensive review for discretionary policy choices than for statutory interpretations—
that is, an intensive hard look review for the former, and a more relaxed reasonableness 
review for the latter.118 If substantial deference to the agency is warranted in Chevron 
step two because Congress has implicitly left a matter up to the agency to decide, should 
not at least as much deference be given when the agency is exercising discretionary 
authority that Congress has plainly granted it?  
 
But apart from the question of what courts should be doing, there is the question of what 
they are doing. Are arbitrary and capricious review and Chevron step two, as applied by 
courts, actually the same thing?  
 
A definitive answer is not in reach, but some empirical data provide tentative grounds for 
concluding that they are not. At least as practiced by the Supreme Court, Chevron step 
                                                
115 See Household Credit Services, Inc v Pfennig, 541 US 232, 242 (2004); Astrue v 
Capato ex rel BNC, 132 S Ct 2021, 2034 (2012). 
116 See Nat’l Assn of Reg Utility Comm’rs v ICC, 41 F3d 721 (DC Cir 1994); Nat’l Org 
of Veterans Advocates, Inc v Sec’y of Veterans’ Affairs, 669 F3d 1340 (Fed Cir 2012). 
117 Mark Seidenfeld, ‘A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in 
Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes’ (1994) 73 Tex L Rev; Ronald M Levin, 
‘The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, (1996) 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1253; 
see also Verizon Commc’ns, Inc v FCC, 535 US 467 (2002) (adopting a similar 
approach). 
118 Then-Judge (now Justice) Stephen Breyer flagged the anomaly in a law review article 
almost thirty years ago. Stephen Breyer ‘Judicial Review of Questions of Law and 
Policy’ (1986) 38 Admin L Rev 363.  
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two appears to be a more deferential form of review. According to the data collected by 
Eskridge and Baer, of the 54 cases decided between 1984 and 2006 in which the Supreme 
Court applied Chevron step two, the Court concluded the agency’s interpretation was 
reasonable in 53.119 By way of contrast, in a study of all cases in which actions of the 
EPA or National Labor Relations Board are subjected to arbitrariness review in the 
appeals courts between 1995 and 2006, Thomas Miles and Cass Sunstein find that the 
agencies won 64% of the time.120 Although these studies involve different courts, 
different years, and (in the case of the latter) only a small sample of agencies, they 
provide some reason to think that, as actually practiced by courts, Chevron step two 
review is substantially less intensive than arbitrary and capricious review.  
 
To the extent that we expect courts to continue to favor the hard look variant of arbitrary 
and capricious review, these findings should not come as a surprise. Chevron step two 
does not require the agency to demonstrate the superiority of its policy choice to the 
alternatives, but courts applying hard look review may well expect such a showing from 
agencies. However, to the extent that the Supreme Court has signaled a pullback from the 
intensity of hard look review in Fox Television, we may witness something like a 
convergence between Chevron step two and arbitrary and capricious review in years to 
come.121  
                                                
119 Eskridge and Baer (n 111). 
120 Thomas J Miles and Cass R Sunstein, ‘The Real World of Arbitrariness Review’ 
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Data Processing (n 40) 686. The Eleventh Circuit, by contrast, decided that substantial 
evidence review requires a “harder look” than “the more deferential arbitrary and 
capricious standard.” AFL-CIO v OSHA, 965 F 2d 962 (11th Cir 1992). Nor is the 
confusion confined to the lower federal courts. In the words of the current edition of the 
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Conclusion	  
 
The intricacies and vagaries of American administrative law doctrine, coupled with the 
difficulty of reliably assessing empirically what courts are doing in practice, make it 
hazardous to generalize about judicial review. Still, as I suggested at the outset, a few 
points stand out.  
 
One of these is closely related to the intricacies and vagaries of doctrine: namely, that 
judicial review is unpredictable. As this chapter demonstrates, the unpredictability 
operates on more than one level. For instance, it is not always clear whether a court will 
treat an agency’s exercise of discretion as a policy choice, to be evaluated under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard, or as a construction of an ambiguous statute, to be 
evaluated within the Mead/Chevron/Skidmore framework. But even assuming that the 
court applies the arbitrary and capricious standard, how intensively will it scrutinize the 
agency action? Will the court apply hard look review, à la State Farm, or reasonableness 
review, à la Fox Television? If, on the other hand, the court treats the agency action as a 
statutory interpretation, will it apply the Chevron two-step approach or Skidmore’s 
sliding scale of deference? More fundamentally, how do the method and intensity of 
review under the different approaches compare? I have argued elsewhere that some forms 
of uncertainty in administrative law can have value as levers for shaping agency behavior 
under some circumstances.122 But no one, I think, would argue that the level of 
unpredictability that pervades American judicial review doctrine is optimally calibrated 
to serve any end.  
                                                                                                                                            
venerable Gellhorn and Byse casebook, “If one looks for it, one can find Supreme Court 
statements that seem to suggest that the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is less 
demanding than the ‘substantial evidence’ test; that the two standards are the same; and 
even perhaps that the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is more demanding.” Peter 
Strauss and others, Gellhorn and Byse’s Administrative Law, Cases and Comments (11th 
edn, Foundation Press 2011) 960. 
122 Jud Mathews, ‘Deference Lotteries,’ (2013) 91 Tex L Rev 1349. 
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One consequence of the confusions in judicial review doctrine may be that they create 
more space for the play of politics in the judicial review of discretionary decisions by 
agencies. To take one example, the Miles and Sunstein study of arbitrariness review cases 
notes a statistically significant relationship between the political party of the President 
who appoints a judge and how that judge votes. Miles and Sunstein find that Democratic 
panels of judges approve liberal agency decisions at higher rates than they approve 
conservative agency decisions, and they find the opposite pattern for Republican 
panels.123 Doctrinal uncertainty may abet politically-motivated judging, by creating 
decision environments in which judges can in fact be guided by policy considerations, 
and still credibly claim to find support for their approaches in one or another strand of 
doctrine. It may also be the case, of course, that the causal arrow points the other way as 
well: that the politics of judging may themselves generate some of the puzzles and 
inconsistencies we find in the doctrine.  
 
A second key point is that judicial review in American administrative law is symmetrical 
in a way that traditional proportionality review is not. Whether proceeding under the 
arbitrary and capricious rubric, Chevron, Skidmore, or a different standard, American 
courts can hear claims not only that the agency has adopted measures that infringe too 
much on private interests, but also that the agency’s chosen means are not sufficiently 
potent to achieve policy objectives. This was the nature of the challenge in State Farm, as 
well as in several of the D.C. Circuit’s influential hard look precedents.124 This equal 
opportunity scrutiny presents a significant contrast with traditional proportionality 
review, the subtests of which are all squarely trained on detecting government overreach. 
The symmetry of review may also be among the factors that often make it difficult for 
                                                
123 Miles and Sunstein (n 120). 
124 See Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 409 F 2d 467 (1974) 
(remanding portions of an asbestos regulation deemed insufficiently protective of 
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agencies to anticipate what will transpire in court. Relative to proportionality, the 
American approach opens new angles of attack from which parties can challenge agency 
choices, and—especially when coupled with the hard look insistence that an agency’s 
record comprehensively justifies its choice—can make judicial review a harrowing and 
unpredictable experience. 
 
In principle, it makes sense for a judicial review regime to hold agencies to account for 
doing too little with their discretionary powers as well as too much. One-sided scrutiny 
runs the risk of creating a systematic anti-regulatory bias in judicial review. In practice, 
however, it is not entirely clear that the American approach successfully avoids this 
result. Ironically, it is possible that penalizing agencies for doing too little gives them an 
incentive to do nothing at all. As noted already, it is very difficult in the American system 
to obtain judicial review of agency inaction. Shielding agencies from judicial review 
when they do nothing, but subjecting them to aggressive scrutiny reversal when they take 
discretionary actions they do not go far enough, gives agencies interested in avoiding 
judicial reversal an added reason simply not to act at all. This observation feeds into the 
broader critique, discussed above, that aggressive judicial review can lead to the 
ossification of the rulemaking process. In this context, though, relaxing the scrutiny of 
judicial review is not the only option for reducing perverse incentives for agencies not to 
act: lowering the barriers to judicial review of agency inaction could also have an effect.  
 
I close with the observation that there is a tendency in American administrative law to 
proceduralize substantive review. Even though the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee 
stopped courts from imposing on agencies additional procedural requirements, such as 
hearings, reviewing courts still have a tendency to describe the faults they find with 
agency choices in terms of the agency’s decision-making process. So the Supreme Court 
in State Farm does not hold that NHTSA’s failure to impose an airbag-only requirement 
was inherently irrational, but instead faults the agency for failing to adequately consider 
an airbag-only option.  
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The proceduralization of review may serve as a judicial defense mechanism of sorts. 
Required to sit in judgment over agencies’ sensitive policy choices, judges would 
understandably seek to conduct their review in a way that anticipates and diffuses the 
charge that they are simply substituting their own judgment for agencies’. Shifting the 
analytic focus from the policy’s merits to the agency’s justification is one way to do this. 
One consequence may be to hamper agency action, by requiring agencies to shoulder 
burdens of justification that may sometimes verge on the unreasonable. But as noted, 
another may be to create more space for second attempts in administrative law. A judicial 
remand of agency policy is not necessarily a dead end if agencies can come back to court 
with justifications for their policies that pass judicial muster.  
 
